The Limits of Democratization Through a Regional Hegemon: South African Linkage and Leverage and the Skewed Playing Field in Lesotho Party Competition

Jonathan van Eerd[1]

Abstract

This article has two aims: First, it examines the effect of a *democratic* and *non*-Western regional hegemon on democratization processes in neighboring countries, applied to the case of South Africa and its influence on democratization in Lesotho. Second, it applies Levitsky and Way's framework to the case of Lesotho. The results of the analysis attenuate optimism about the potential of democratic non-Western regional hegemons to replace missing Western linkage and induce full democratization in neighboring countries. The analysis shows that there is high linkage and leverage between South Africa and Lesotho according to Levitsky and Way's measurement. Yet the 2012 turnover through elections in Lesotho turns out to be a sign of unstable competitive authoritarianism, rather than an indication of an evolution towards full democratization, i.e. it is the result of high Western and South African leverage, low Western linkage, and low organizational power of the incumbent party. A qualitative assessment of linkage between South Africa and Lesotho shows that linkage between the two countries is not as dense as suggested by the measurement according to Levitsky and Way's criteria. This calls into question whether their measurement criteria for linkage actually get at their own hypothesized role of linkage.

Keywords: South Africa, Lesotho, authoritarianism, democratization, foreign policy, elections

---

[1]jonathan.vaneerd@pw.uzh.ch, University of Zurich, Institute of Political Science, Affolternstrasse 56, 8050 Zurich, Switzerland.

The *Foundation for Scientific Research at the University of Zurich* enabled field studies in Lesotho and the National University of Lesotho provided helpful assistance. I thank Oscar Mwangi, Victor Shale, Holo 'Nyane and Sofonea Shale for their help during filed studies, Manuel Mühlebach and Christian Hutter for assistance, and Dieter Ruloff for general support. For their excellent reviews and comments on earlier versions of this manuscript I thank the editors of this special issue—Matthijs Bogaards and Sebastian Elischer—, the participants of the related workshop in Lüneburg, as well as Simon Bornschier and Fabio Wasserfallen. I also thank two anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and suggestions.

1. Introduction

The aims of this article are twofold: First, it examines the effect of a *democratic* and *non*-Western regional hegemon on democratization processes in neighboring countries, applied to the case of democratic South Africa and its influence on democratization in Lesotho.[2] Second, it applies Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework to Lesotho. The article analyzes whether linkage between the non-Western, democratic regional hegemon South Africa and its neighbor Lesotho can compensate for Lesotho's lack of linkage to the U.S. and the EU 15 and lead to full democratization in Lesotho. After all, Lesotho experienced its first real turnover by multiparty elections in 2012 and neutral observers such as Freedom House praised the peaceful turnover as Lesotho's final step to full democratization (Freedom House 2013a). I will examine whether this positive assessment of Lesotho's contemporary electoral regime is indeed justified and whether it can be attributed to the degree of linkage between Lesotho and the democratic regional hegemon South Africa.

The article applies Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework of analysis and their measurement criteria to analyze the role of linkage, leverage, organizational power, and regime type in the case of South Africa and Lesotho and compares it with South Africa's influence in other neighboring countries in the region (please refer to the introduction of this special issue for a detailed discussion of Levitsky and Way's framework of analysis in the sub-Saharan African context).

The analysis is organized as follows: First, I adapt Levitsky and Way's concept of linkage between the West and competitive authoritarian regimes to linkage between non-Western democratic hegemons and neighboring countries in their respective regions. Second, I analyze South Africa's linkage and leverage to Lesotho during the 1990s according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 374–375) measurement of linkage and leverage. Third, I assess Lesotho's degree of organizational power during the 1990s according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 376–380) respective measurement. Forth, the article traces the development of the regime type in Lesotho in connection with South African linkage and leverage from 1993 to 2012 analogous to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–371) regime type measurement. Fifth, the article compares the successfulness of South African linkage and leverage to induce full democratiza-

[2] Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa. Lesotho has a population of two million people, comparable to Namibia and Botswana in the region. Its area size is comparable to that of Belgium's. The people of Lesotho, pronounced *Lesutu*, are called Basotho (*Basutu*). The singular is Mosotho (*Mosutu*).

tion in Lesotho with its impact on democratization in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Sixth, the article identifies two explanations for the relative unsuccessfulness of South African linkage and leverage at inducing regional democratization. Lastly, the article concludes.

Besides relying on secondary sources and Pan-African, South African or Basotho news portals, the analysis draws on field research and interviews conducted by the author in Lesotho in 2010.[3]

2. South African linkage and leverage and processes of democratization in the southern African region

According to Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 23–26, 41), the degree of *linkage to the West*, the United States and the EU 15, explains whether competitive authoritarian regimes fully democratize over time or not (cf. with the introduction of this special issue).

Linkage does not necessarily have to be Western. Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 50) point to cases in which linkage to important non-Western states blunts the impact of ties to the West: e.g., Malaysia's ties to the international Muslim community or Belarus and Ukraine's ties to Russia. Yet Levitsky and Way are silent on how high linkage to a *democratic*, non-Western regional hegemon like South Africa and its interaction with Western democratizing pressures influences the regime-type of connected countries in a region. Their analysis of high-linkage cases that successfully democratized over time suggests that it is rather the *regional* component than the *international* component of Western hegemony that triggered democratization in high-linkage cases through geographical proximity. Nine of ten of Levitsky and Way's correctly predicted cases of full democratization democratized rather due to high linkage to a *regional* hegemon, the EU 15 in Eastern Europe, and the U.S. in the Americas, rather than an *international hegemon* as in the case of successfully democratizing Taiwan and its high linkage to the U.S.

---

[3] In 2010, I conducted interviews in Lesotho with ten high-ranking parliamentarians, ministers and party representatives of the three most important parties (both urban and rural backgrounds): *Lesotho Congress for Democracy* (LCD) (3 interviewees), *All Basotho Convention* (ABC) (3), and *Basotho National Party* (BNP) (2), as well as two minor parties, *National Independent Party* (NIP) (1) and *Lesotho Worker's Party* (LWP) (1). Furthermore, the analysis relies on expert interviews with two representatives from local NGOs, a senior local journalist, and a representative of the *Independent Electoral Commission* (IEC).

Hence, this article closes a gap in Levitsky and Way's analysis by investigating the democratizing potential of a non-Western *regional* and *democratic* hegemon such as South Africa. Lesotho, in turn, is selected as a particularly good dramatization of South Africa's attempts (or lack thereof) at regional democratization. Because of its unique geographic position and economic dependency (yet regarding population and area size, still a formidable country), and its record of several multiparty elections since 1993, the potential for successful regional democratizing influence should be relatively high in Lesotho. If regional democratizing influences even would fail in Lesotho, chances for success should neither be too high in other connected countries in the southern African region nor in different world-regions that are also in the sphere of influence of democratic regional hegemons such as Brazil or India. To put the case of Lesotho in perspective, comparison will be drawn with an integrated assessment of the strength of South African democratizing influences in neighboring Swaziland and Zimbabwe (the former most similar to Lesotho and the latter the most prominent case of competitive authoritarianism in southern Africa).

During the golden decade of Western democratizing pressures after the end of the Cold War (Levitsky and Way 2010; Boix 2011), post-apartheid South Africa was in a formidable position to influence democratization processes of connected countries in its region. South Africa became the democratic and economic powerhouse in the region. Between 1995 and 2005, South Africa was the most democratic country in sub-Saharan Africa alongside three African islands. Elections were free and fair, and the playing field in electoral competition was acceptably even during that time (Freedom House 2013c; QoG 2013). South African foreign policy shifted dramatically from active and armed destabilization of its neighbors to active democracy promotion in the region (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 378–381; Southall 2003, pp. 291–292). South Africa joined the *Southern African Development Community* (SADC), and the organization's development goals were supplemented with an emphasis on democracy, good governance, and regional stability (Van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010, pp. 750–751).

2.1 South African democratizing influences and the (competitive) authoritarian regimes in Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe

A linkage- and leverage-assessment according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 372–375) measurement criteria shows that Lesotho is a particularly well-suited case to analyze the actual impact of South Africa's democratizing potential. Both South African leverage over Lesotho and linkage between the two countries turns out to be

higher than in other connected countries of the southern African region such as Swaziland or Zimbabwe. Accordingly, South Africa's democratization attempts in the southern African region should be most successful in Lesotho. If they fail in Lesotho, it is not likely that they would succeed elsewhere in South Africa's sphere of influence.

2.1.1 Linkage and Leverage between South Africa and Lesotho

South African *leverage* is high in the case of Lesotho (as is leverage of the U.S. and the EU 15 in Lesotho). Land-locked Lesotho is economically highly dependent on South Africa. The country features an extremely low-sized economy both in global terms as well as in comparison with its southern African neighbors.[4] In comparison, Swaziland, which is most similar with Lesotho regarding area size and geographical position, used to have an average GDP that was almost double that of Lesotho's between 1990 and 2000, despite a population half of Lesotho's size. Likewise, Lesotho was on average more aid dependent than the median country in Africa, whereas Swaziland is among the ten least aid-dependent countries in Africa (QoG 2013). In 2000, foreign funding provided more than half of Lesotho's national budget (Kabemba 2004, p. 40). Lesotho imports far more goods from South Africa than it exports. The country is highly dependent on migrant remittances from South Africa. (Fischer Weltalmanach 2003, p. 498; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 88, 347). Lesotho participates in a customs union with South Africa and has its currency tied to the South African rand. It is highly dependent on the revenues from that customs union and is therefore vulnerable to any changes in the agreement. (afrol News 2013; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 344–345).

Leverage needs *linkage* to substantiate external democratization pressures and to push it over the edge of superficial and "electoralist" pressures that do not go beyond the requirement of minimally free multiparty elections. Lesotho is an African case like any other regarding low linkage to Western powers (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 50-54, 236–237, 374–375). There is relatively strong donor involvement in Lesotho. The U.S., Ireland, and the EU are the largest donors, and the U.S. became a major importer of Lesotho's textile industry due to preferential access to the U.S. market (Manoeli 2012; OECD 2011, pp. 11–12). Nonetheless, ties to the West are relatively low in terms of the linkage measurement of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 374–375)

[4] Lesotho belongs to the lowest quartile in sub-Saharan Africa and is the smallest economy of the SADC (World Bank 2009).

and is comparable to other African countries. For example, there are only six diplomatic representations present in Lesotho, whereas countries in the region with a similar population size such as Namibia or Botswana host 31 and 19 diplomatic representations, respectively, and still belong to Levitsky and Way's group of medium/low linkage (Go Lesotho 2014; Namibweb 2014; Republic of Botswana 2014).

According to the four linkage measurement components of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 374–375)—(1) economic, (2) social, (3) communication, and (4) intergovernmental ties—*linkage between Lesotho and South Africa is high*. (1) In 1998, 90% of imported goods came from South Africa while 65% percent of Lesotho's exports went to South Africa. The joint *Lesotho Highlands Water Project* ties the two countries together because of Lesotho's need for electric power and South Africa's need for water. (2) Labor migration from Lesotho to South Africa reached such an extent during the last 100 years that it is difficult to obtain reliable numbers. More ethnic Basotho are permanently living in South Africa than in Lesotho itself (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 173, 246–250; Cobbe 2012). (3) South African radio and TV reach Lesotho and Internet access in Lesotho is slightly above the median of all sub-Saharan African countries (Freedom House 1999–2000, p. 294; QoG 2013). (4) Lesotho and South Africa share mutual membership in the regional organizations *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) and *Southern African Customs Union* (SACU) (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 343–347). In sum, according to Levitsky and Way's measurement there was and still is both high leverage and high linkage between South Africa and Lesotho.

Despite these apparently favorable conditions for full democratization at least in Lesotho, the following sections show that South Africa did not fulfill its democracy-promoting promises neither in Lesotho nor in the more difficult cases of Swaziland or Zimbabwe. South Africa's leverage effectively reinforced Western leverage to the degree that it pushed Lesotho from a military regime to a competitive and moderately authoritarian regime *without* tutelary powers, yet South African linkage did not manage to substitute for the lack of Western linkage and push Lesotho to full democratization. Hence, despite its initially sincere intentions to serve as a regional democracy promoter, South Africa soon followed a stability-promoting—likewise to the U.S. in Egypt or the EU in the Middle East and North Africa—, and—if at all—"electoralist"-promoting foreign policy in the southern African region (Brownlee 2012; Youngs 2010).

2.1.2 South African democratizing influences and the evolution of the competitive authoritarian regime in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012

In accordance with the high degree of leverage South Africa had over Lesotho and the relatively high linkage between the two countries, South Africa's democracy-promoting undertakings were most extensive there. South Africa intervened prior to the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1993, in 1994 and 1998 to curtail tutelary powers in Lesotho, and it mediated post-election conflict after the 1998 election, which led to election-related institutional change and temporary moderation of Lesotho's competitive authoritarianism. Nonetheless, the following analysis shows that democracy promotion did not go all the way. South African interventions did not effectively touch Lesotho's fundamental problems in civil liberties, press freedom, state media access and systematic resource disparities between the incumbent party and opposition parties after the re-introduction of multiparty-elections in 1993 until the most recent election in 2012.

Organizational power in Lesotho

Lesotho was and is a case of low *organizational power* due to low *state coercive capacity* and medium *party strength*. In combination with low Western linkage and high leverage, unstable competitive authoritarianism would be Lesotho's most likely regime trajectory since the re-introduction of multiparty elections in 1993 until present (cf. with introduction of this special issue); provided that we disregard its high linkage to democratic South Africa.

State coercive capacity is low in Lesotho. Only founded at the end of the 1970s, Lesotho's army remained small and underdeveloped. Equipment and training was poor, and control of the mostly inhospitable and mountainous national terrain, weak (Bardill and Cobbe 1985, pp. 130–131; Southall and Fox 1999; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 17, 360–366; QoG 2013; World Bank 2009). After the first multiparty elections in 1993, the army was hostile to the newly elected BCP-government and staged a successful coup against it after the 1998 elections. Only the subsequent South Africa-led SADC military intervention managed to restore the electoral regime.

Party scope and cohesion of the former authoritarian BNP and the successful contender of the 1993 elections, the *Basutoland Congress Party* (BCP), as well as the BCP's successor organization for the 1998 elections, LCD, were all medium according to Levitsky and Way's criteria (2010, pp. 377-378). Both the BNP and the BCP, and later the LCD, managed to field structures and candidates throughout the country, but

were plagued by internal factionalism (Freedom House 1993–1994, pp. 365–366; Southall 1994, pp. 112–114; Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 675–676; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, p. 43; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 19–20, 29–31, 130–131, 164–166, 371–372).

1993–1998: Tutelary Powers and South Africa's push for multiparty-elections in Lesotho

During the 1970s and 1980s Lesotho was a de facto one-party state. Hegemonic BNP-rule ended after a military coup in 1986 and resulted in unstable military rule. South Africa's pro-democratic push came for the first time into play in Lesotho in 1991 when South African and Western donors' pressure combined with high leverage over the heavily aid-dependent and economically South African-dependent country forced the military regime to set up a new and democratic constitution (Southall 1994, p. 112; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, pp. 42–43). First multiparty elections were scheduled for 1993 and set the country on a track of competitive authoritarianism. Initially, however, unelected "tutelary" powers like the army, some police units, and the constitutional monarch, King Letsie III, severely restricted the authority of the 1993 elected BCP (Freedom House 1993–1994, p. 365, 1994–1995, pp. 359–361, 1995–1996, p. 305, 1997–1998, pp. 330–331; Coplan and Quinlan 1997, pp. 42–46; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 139–141, 359–366; Southall and Fox 1999; Kabemba 2004, pp. 40–41).[5]

Although the 1993 election process itself was considered free and fair by international observers, the playing field was skewed in favor of the former ruling party, BNP, over the winning BCP (cf. with Table 1 coding the various governments in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012 in line with Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–371) measurement of regime outcomes) (Freedom House 1993–1994, pp. 365-366; Southall 1994, p. 113; Southall and Fox 1999, p. 672). Leading up to the 1998 elections, in turn, the playing field was skewed in favor of the incumbent LCD to the disadvantage of the BNP and other opposition parties, while the election process itself was generally considered free and fair by international observers and experts (Freedom House 1998–1999, p. 283; Southall and Fox 1999). There were incidents of press freedom violations and a general incumbency bias regarding state media access and campaign

[5] Levitsky and Way (2010) do not discuss why they exclude the case of Lesotho from their analysis. Amongst others, "tutelary" powers that stand outside of the democratic regime should not be present (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 32–33, 365–366).

resources (see respective codes in Table 1) (Freedom House 1997–1998, pp. 330–331, 1998–1999, p. 283; Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 678–679; U.S. Department of State 2000).

Table 1: Competitive Authoritarianism in Lesotho between 1993 and 2012

Government	Violations of free & fair election procedures	Violations of civil liberties	Uneven playing field	Tutelary Powers	Regime Type
Transitional Military Regime (1993)			X (1, 2)	X	CA
BCP/LCD (1993–1998)	X (4)	X (1)	X (2, 3)	X	CA
LCD (1998–2002)			X (2, 3)		CA
LCD (2002–2007)	X (4)	X (1, 3)	X (2, 3)		CA
LCD/DC (2007–2012)	X (4)	X (1, 2, 3, 4)	X (2, 3)		CA

For data sources cf. with references in this section.

CA: Competitive Authoritarianism

X: Indicates presence of tutelary powers or occurrence of abuse in a particular dimension of CA according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 365–369) coding scheme: *Violations of free & fair election procedures* (4)=Highly uneven access to media and resource. *Violations of civil liberties* (1)=Frequent harassment of independent media for political reasons; (2)=serious political attack on the media; (3)=government engages in actions that restrict freedom of speech; (4)=serious attack on opposition figures. *Uneven playing field* (1)=Politicized state institutions; (2)=uneven media access; (3)=uneven access to resources.

The opposition alliance of the BNP and the old BCP claimed outright electoral rigging in the 1998 elections rather than putting emphasis on pointing out flaws in the playing field of party competition. The rigging allegation caused considerable attention in South African and international media and led to the installation of a SADC commission tasked to scrutinize the conduct and results of the elections (Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 679–685). The commission rejected most of the opposition parties' complaints (Langa 1998, cit. in Southall and Fox 1999, pp. 681, 688).

Meanwhile, the opposition alliance demonstrated in the capital while BNP-associated junior ranks of the *Lesotho Defense Forces* (LDF) started a mutiny against their senior officers because they believed them to have sold out to the LCD. Lesotho became ungovernable, and the new LCD prime minister, Mosisili, had to ask the SADC for help. South African and Batswana troops ended the mutiny, and the LCD

remained in power (Southall and Fox 1999; Elklit 2002; Southall 2003; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. xxxii, 20, 31, 166, 364–365).

Lack of full democratization in Lesotho after the South African 1998 Intervention

While the events around the 1998 elections and the subsequent involvement of the SADC and South Africa led to the effective disempowerment of previous "tutelary" powers in Lesotho, such as the security forces and the King, as well as the introduction of the more inclusive mixed-member proportional (MMP) electoral system and a professionalization of the IEC and the election process in general, flaws in the playing field of party competition remained in place and prevented full democratization of Lesotho's regime (see Table 1) (Southall 2003, pp. 277-278; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 120–122, 366).

Lesotho's politicians finally realized Western donors and South Africa's leverage over their country due to the heightened international attention during the 1998 crisis. Both the political class and the security forces realized that coups were not an acceptable means to power anymore. The next elections needed to run as smoothly as possible to avoid losing donor money. Also, South Africa needed smooth elections in Lesotho to justify its intervention "ex-post" (cf. Southall 2003, pp. 281–282). Thanks to international and South African pressure the "electoralist" norm finally took root in Lesotho. Accordingly, the professionally held and extensively observed elections under the new, more inclusive MMP electoral system in 2002 were a considerable success (Elklit 2002; Southall 2003).

Donors were strongly focused on the smooth running of the 2002 elections in order to avoid another political crisis (Kabemba 2004, p. 43; Southall 2003, pp. 286–287). South Africa, in turn, made sure to keep a low profile overall and was mainly involved in providing background support to the immediate goal of stability and smooth elections rather than pointing out less visible flaws in Lesotho's electoral regime. South Africa's low profile was reflected in president Mbeki's low-key acclaim of the 2002 election success in order to not have it taken as a precedent of South Africa's willingness to substantially intervene in other southern African countries' affairs, such as Zimbabwe's (Southall 2003, pp. 271, 285, 294).

In this line, a senior Basotho journalist argues that the 1998 intervention rather strengthened the incumbent LCD due to the abolishment of "tutelary" powers and the professionalization of the security forces while efforts to level the playing field in party competition did not receive the same *rigeur*, which would have strengthened

the opposition parties in turn.[6] Accordingly, the playing field in party competition remained substantially skewed preceding the 2002 elections despite some improvements, which were owed to the heightened regional and international attention after the 1998 crisis (see respective coding for the 1998–2002 government in Table 1). The elections resulted in an absolute majority for the LCD regarding vote share and 77 out of 78 constituency seats while the BNP won 21 seats of the 40 compensatory PR seats (Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 20-21, 157-158; Southall 2003, pp. 284, 288–290).

After the relatively successful 2002 elections, installation of the more inclusive MMP electoral system and the effective abolishment of "tutelary" powers in Lesotho, Western and South African attention to Lesotho politics decreased. Furthermore, since the transfer period from the Thabo Mbeki government to the Jacob Zuma government South Africa started to experience increasing deficiencies in its own democratic regime in terms of violations of press freedom and independence of the judiciary making it all the more unlikely to pressure for full democratization in Lesotho or other connected countries in the region (Southall 2013, pp. 124, 127, 154–155, 202–209; Freedom House 2007, 2013c; QoG 2013). Accordingly, reports about violations of press freedom and uneven access to the media in Lesotho and other neighboring countries did not reverberate too strongly in South Africa, anymore. Domestic critics of incumbent abuses regarding press freedom and state media access in Lesotho, in turn, could not back up their criticisms by referral to South Africa. Rather, it is the other way around—incidences of press freedom violations and related legislation in South Africa started to back up Lesotho's government agencies and legislators in defending the status quo of restricted press freedom legislation and practices.

Accordingly, after the Lesotho 2002 elections attempts by the governing LCD to skew the playing field increased again both in terms of access to the state-owned media and campaign resources as well as in the increasing use of libel and defamation laws with stiff penalties against independent media and journalists that were critical of the government (see respective coding for the 2002–2007 government in Table 1).

In advent of the 2007 elections the governing LCD experienced another manifestation of its low level of cohesiveness. The former LCD-minister of communications, Thomas Thabane, formed a new opposition party, the *All Basotho Convention* (ABC). Eighteen LCD MPs crossed the floor to the new ABC, causing a hung parliament and forcing Prime Minister Mosisili to call for early elections in February 2007 (Likoti

[6] Interview conducted by the author in Maseru, July 2010.

2008, pp. 155–156; Rosenberg et al. 2004, pp. 387–388). Early elections clearly disfavored the ABC in properly preparing its campaign, as the new party was only formed in October 2006.[7] This caused a short preparation time for the IEC, which resulted in a generally lower standard of the election organization in comparison with that of 2002.

Despite its cohesiveness problems and declined voter support the LCD managed to secure a two-thirds majority in parliament through the co-optation of a small former opposition party and the use of a loophole in the constitution and the design of the MMP electoral system. The electoral result caused much confusion among the opposition parties, among them the ABC and the BNP, and they disputed the results and called for a general strike. Furthermore, Thabane, the new leader of the strongest opposition party in parliament, ABC, was deprived of the status "Leader of Opposition", a position that would have endowed him and his party with useful privileges and resources and would have helped to attenuate the skewness of the playing field to some degree for the next elections in 2012.[8] Fears of a repetition of the post-1998 election crisis prompted the SADC to mediate the conflict (Elklit 2008). This led to another electoral reform in 2011 that made future manipulation of the MMP much more difficult (EISA 2013, pp. 10–12; Freedom House 2012).

Hence, reforms were again focused on the immediate electoral process and the electoral system rather than deficiencies in terms of campaign resources as well as state media access and press freedom. Accordingly, the playing field remained significantly skewed after the 2007 elections. Furthermore, in opposition to previous elections, there were even violent clashes between government supporters and opposition supporters in advance of the 2012 elections, and opposition politicians feared for their security. Furthermore, the government tried to formally limit public meetings of the opposition (see respective coding for the 2007–2012 government in Table 1) (Freedom House 2011, Makthetha 2012). In opposition to this, the 2012 electoral process itself was an example for a further professionalization of the IEC. Voter education was expanded, and the IEC tried to level the access of opposition parties to the state media. However, despite these efforts, state media airtime remained heavily skewed in favor of the ruling LCD, overall (EISA 2013, pp. 32–34; Freedom House 2013a).

---

[7] Interview with high-ranking politician of the ABC in Maseru, July 2010. Cf. also with Elklit (2008, p. 14).

[8] Interviews with political expert and representative of the IEC in Maseru, July 2010. Cf. also with Elklit (2008), Likoti (2009), U.S. Department of State (2008), and EISA (2013, p. 10).

In continuation of previous developments, low cohesiveness of the governing LCD manifested itself once more, just three months before the 2012 election. A power struggle with the LCD secretary general, Mothetjoa Metsing, forced Prime Minister Mosisili to leave the LCD with 45 LCD MPs and form a new party, the *Democratic Congress* (DC). The remainder of LCD MPs stayed with the LCD rump under the new leadership of Metsing and went into an opposition alliance with the ABC and the BNP (allAfrica 2012a, 2012b; Freedom House 2013a). With only three months left, increasing alienation of former LCD voters due to the recurring splits and two former LCD party barons to front, Thabane of the ABC and Metsing of the LCD rump, the task proved to be very difficult for Mosisili and his DC despite the considerably skewed playing field. As a result, the DC and Mosisili only secured 39% of the vote. The DC only received 48 seats in parliament, falling short of the necessary absolute majority of 61 seats (allAfrica 2012a; Nunley 2013). The ABC, LCD, and BNP secured a total of 61 seats and agreed to form a coalition government under newly elected Prime Minister Thabane of the ABC (*Sunday Express* 2012; Nunley 2013). Accordingly, latent unstable competitive authoritarianism finally resulted in effective incumbency change and full-blown unstable competitive authoritarianism.

In sum, both high South African and international leverage and effective interventions led to an improvement and professionalization of the electoral process after the 1998 post-electoral crisis. Yet, the playing field in party competition remained substantially skewed regarding freedom of the press and state media access, and significant resource disparities remained in place. Certainly, post-apartheid South Africa's reluctance to appear too invasive in its regional foreign policy, together with the internationally and regionally declining interest in Lesotho's politics after the settlement of the post-1998 electoral crisis and the successful 2002 elections under the newly introduced MMP electoral system allowed the continued deterioration of the playing field after 2002 (cf. with Table 1). The declining interest in Lesotho's elections has also been reflected by the declining interest of the South African media regarding the politics of its neighbor. According to a media-coverage analysis of the 2012 Lesotho election by Makthetha (2012), only one South African news outlet sent a correspondent to Lesotho during the election. South African publications perceived Lesotho as a dependent rather than a co-dependent neighbor whose volatile politics could lead to turmoil, as in 1998, and force South Africa to intervene again.

Survival of CA or full democratization after incumbency change in 2012?

As a consequence of the decreasing South African and international interest and the concomitant decreasing push for full democratization in Lesotho after the 2002 elections, the structures and institutional conditions for skewing the playing field in multi-party competition are still in place after the 2012 incumbency change. Despite their importance for full democratization these deficiencies do not receive much attention, domestically, regionally, or internationally. After all, the actual members of the coalition government and the opposition politicians, including former Prime Minister Mosisili, used to profit from the very same skewed playing field earlier in their political careers. Furthermore, the current coalition government is very fragile with an absolute majority hinging on one seat. In such an environment, unpopular reforms could risk the survival of the coalition (cf. *Public Eye* 2013). Accordingly, it seems rather plausible that the new coalition government will not substantially level the playing field and even might find it useful to rely on it in upcoming elections and/or with the handling of an eventually more critical press after the end of the "honeymoon-phase."

Preliminary evidence supports this pessimistic assessment: While the new Prime Minister Thabane increased efforts to fight corruption, these efforts also served him to harass and eventually get rid of strong men in the opposition-turned DC, such as Monyane Moleleki, the official leader of the opposition in parliament. After assuming office, Thabane promised to touch issues of good governance, stability, and economic improvements, but remained silent about abolishing opportunities for incumbency abuse regarding the playing field in future elections (Freedom House 2013a; *Sunday Express* 2012; Ntaote 2013). During the first year of the coalition government, virtually no legislation was brought before parliament, let alone legislation intended to level the playing field (Tefo 2013). After all, Prime Minister Thabane used to be an important member of the very same LCD government that stopped legislation against the use of government resources for campaigning in the run-up to elections.[9]

2.1.3 South African democratizing influences and the (competitive) authoritarian regimes in Zimbabwe and Swaziland

Also Swaziland and Zimbabwe experienced internal turmoil and even stronger domestic pressures for democratization than Lesotho during the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s. However, and in line with the comparatively lower level of

[9] According to a representative of the IEC (interview in Maseru, July 2010).

economic leverage in the case of Swaziland and the low level of "symbolic" leverage in the case of Zimbabwe, South Africa was even more reluctant to intervene. The Zimbabwean political crisis that started in 2000 serves as an impressive example of the difficult and often contradictory South African position in regional foreign policy: Instead of openly criticize, substantially pressure, or even intervene after fraudulent elections and human rights abuses in Zimbabwe that caused international outcry, South Africa choose a strategy of "quiet diplomacy" vis-à-vis the Zimbabwean regime that did not manage to alter the path of Zimbabwean competitive authoritarianism towards full democratization. South Africa was forced to act in this relative passive manner because important domestic and regional discourse would have considered more openly interventionist South African policies on Zimbabwe and Mugabe as complicity in Western "neo-colonial" behavior vis-à-vis Zimbabwe. This would have strongly weakened the regional acceptance of South Africa's hegemonic role in southern Africa (Graham 2006, p. 121; cf. Prys 2009, pp. 202–203).

Swaziland experienced internal threats towards the stability of its authoritarian regime during the 1990s, which opened up another opportunity for South Africa to deliver on its regional democracy-promoting promise. Although leverage of South Africa over Swaziland was and is considerably lower in comparison with leverage over Lesotho due to the stronger Swazi economy, Swaziland is nonetheless most similar to Lesotho due to its very high linkage with South Africa. However, as with Zimbabwe, South Africa was reluctant to intervene. Even Nelson Mandela did not criticize Swaziland's autocracy too strongly after violent pro-democracy demonstrations and strikes in 1996, despite his generally more strongly democracy-promoting impetus than that of his successor, Thabo Mbeki (Matlosa 1998, pp. 323–326, 334–335; Freedom House 1996–1997, p. 467).

2.2 The Mitigated Democracy-Promoting Potential of South African Linkage in the southern African region

What explains the rather mixed record of South African democracy promotion in Lesotho and the southern African region? The analysis of the relatively extensive, but not fully successful South African interventions in Lesotho, and the relatively weak to almost inexistent interventions in Zimbabwe and Swaziland points to two explanations as to why high South African linkage did not turn into a higher degree of leverage that went beyond "quiet diplomacy" or "electoralist" conditionality: (1) South Africa's priorities in the region are stability and security, whereas democracy promotion is subordinated to these ends (cf. Southall 2003, pp. 291–294). (2) High

linkage between South Africa and Lesotho measured according to the four linkage measurement components of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 374–375) does not trigger Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 45–50) democratization-promoting mechanisms. This calls into question whether Levitsky and Way's measurement actually gets at their hypothesized role of linkage. Also note that the analysis so far has shown that South Africa's democracy has displayed democratic deficiencies itself since 2005 and the transition period from the Mbeki era to the Zuma era (Freedom House 2013b, South-all 2013, pp. 154–155, 202–209), which makes it—at least since then—unlikely to demand the "full package" of democracy from its neighbors. However, even during the Mandela years, when intentions to promote full democratization in the region were sincere and South Africa's own quality of democracy still high, democratization promotion did not go all the way; neither in Swaziland in 1996, nor in the most "easy", i.e., the high-leverage case of Lesotho during the critical years of its regime development between the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 until its first MMP-election in 2002.

(1) South Africa's unwillingness to fully deliver on its initial democratizing promises – even when its own quality of democracy was still very high – must be understood in the context of post-apartheid South Africa's role as a newly born democratic regional hegemon in southern Africa, which is surrounded by mostly competitive authoritarian or fully authoritarian neighbors.[10] Post-apartheid South Africa's regional hegemony is essentially dependent on the *regional acceptance* of South Africa's special role in the region. After the end of apartheid, South Africa reshuffled its identity as an "African state" that follows the unwritten law of "African solidarity" in international relations and intends to avoid a repetition of the regional isolation of the apartheid years (van Aardt 1996, p. 115; cf. Prys 2009, p. 200; Freeman 2005, p. 150). Already during the Mandela government with its strong pro-democracy policy in the region a taste of African resistance to South Africa's leadership became apparent when other African leaders did not back President Mandela's protest against the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa by the Nigerian military regime of Sani Abacha in 1995 (Freeman 2005, p. 149). And ample African criticism against South Africa after its intervention in Lesotho 1998 made South Africa more cautious, as it wanted to avoid

[10] As with Lesotho, Botswana is a case of competitive and moderate authoritarianism. Levitsky and Way consider Namibia a "borderline case[…] [between democracy and competitive authoritarianism] that arguably could be included in the sample" of competitive authoritarian regimes, but is "insufficiently authoritarian." Mozambique and Zimbabwe are clear-cut cases of competitive authoritarianism, and Swaziland's monarchy is fully authoritarian (Levitsky and Way 2010, pp. 33–34, 238–256).

any further semblance with the old gunboat diplomacy of apartheid South Africa in the region (Wood et al. 2013, p. 534; Matlosa 1997, pp. 127–129).

After the Mandela years awareness of South Africa's limited abilities to influence politics in other African countries even increased (Graham 2012; Alden and lePere 2004, pp. 28, 72). Accordingly, South Africa downplayed the relative success and democracy-promoting aspect of its interventions in Lesotho after the Lesotho 2002 elections. And it was careful not to interfere in Lesotho's affairs beyond the elimination of the immediate causes of the 1998 post-election instability. Otherwise, its interventions could have been regarded by other competitive authoritarian regimes in the region as a South African attempt on lecturing southern African states on the proper conduct of democracy. This would have further undermined the already tenuous acceptance of South Africa's leadership in the region (cf. Prys 2009, pp. 201–203; Southall 2003, p. 293–295).

The difficulty of combining both post-apartheid South Africa's ambitions of a policy of African solidarity with a policy of democracy promotion in the region became most apparent during the Zimbabwean crisis. The governing ANC was and still is especially indebted to its southern African neighbors due to the price that neighboring countries had to pay because of their ANC support during apartheid. And for the ANC, as a former liberation movement itself, it would be domestically and regionally risky to take a strong stance against the liberation movements turned parties that governed in Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe (cf. Southall 2003, p. 294; Prys 2009, pp. 195, 202; Freeman 2005, pp. 158–160). A strong South African intervention against Mugabe, a former ally in the fight against white minority rule and oppression, and the complete breakdown of the Zimbabwean state could have had a large damaging effect on the social and economic viability of Zimbabwe's neighbors, and endanger post-apartheid South Africa's leadership in the region.

South Africa used its leverage to stop post-Cold War military coups and chaos in Lesotho and restore the "electoralist" regime that it helped to set on track in the first place without pressing for more substantial reforms leading to full democratization. South Africa's priority was to deliver the message to other southern African neighbors that it does not accept military coups as a way to gain power in its own "backyard" while at the same avoid interference in Lesotho's affairs even beyond electoralist pressure. And it also wanted to secure its vested interest in Lesotho as an important water provider (Prys 2009, p. 208; Van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010, p. 752). Hence, as long as competitive authoritarianism provides regime stability and a minimal semblance of democratic legitimacy, which is the case in the majority of

South Africa's neighbors, it serves South Africa's regional hegemony and its interests more than weakening the stability of its neighbors through more intrusive democracy promotion, which would endanger its own self-perception of an "African state" that follows a policy of African solidarity.

Admittedly, Swaziland as the last absolute monarchy in Africa remains a serious stain in democratic South Africa's immediate neighborhood. Yet, in opposition to most authoritarian regimes in Africa at the end of the Cold War, the Swazi King and his royalist entourage in Swaziland were in a comparatively better position vis-à-vis both external leverage and internal threats to their rule. They were able to successfully delay demands for multi-party elections until the third wave of democratization in Africa lost momentum (Booth 2000, pp. 17–38). In comparison to Lesotho, the Swazi crisis was not as severe, as it could have threatened South Africa's security concerns and interests to the degree that an effective intervention would have been worth the risk.

In sum, despite differences in the degree of intrusion of South African interventions, the examples of Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Swaziland can all be interpreted in terms of South Africa's emphasis on regional stability over more interfering democracy promotion (cf. Prys 2009, p. 200; Graham 2006, p. 120).

(2) Although communication ties between South Africa and Lesotho are high according to the measurement criteria of Levitsky and Way and should lead to their democracy-promoting mechanisms, a more qualitative assessment of media and information flows between Lesotho and South Africa show that they rather resemble a one-way street. Basotho citizens are well informed about politics in South Africa due to extensive South African media penetration, while the South African media was and is rather ignorant about political events in Lesotho apart from the 1998 crisis. Civil society and professional ties are not explicitly measured in the operationalization of linkage of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375), and intergovernmental linkage is measured in a rather narrow manner through mutual membership in regional organizations, yet these three dimensions feature prominently in their conceptualization and causal mechanism. In our case, South African NGO activity is focused on domestic issues rather than cross-boarder issues, and intergovernmental penetration does not reach the extent that could be imagined due to the special geographical position of Lesotho in South Africa and the mutual membership in SADC and SACU. Last, the small tertiary sector and the business and finance community in

Lesotho's capital, Maseru, are dominated by South Africa.[11] Therefore, it is unlikely for South Africa to sanction the Maseru business community for its tacit consent with the Lesotho government's skewing of the playing field in party competition. Hence, the external costs of government abuse in Lesotho are not as high as in Eastern European or American cases, which explains why there are no large domestic constituencies for democratic behavior in Lesotho and no electoral opportunities for potential reformers in the country.

In sum, both one-sided informational flows, a South African dominated business community in Maseru, and relatively weak intergovernmental penetration diminished the chance for the democracy-promoting mechanisms of Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) to come into play. This begs the question of whether their measurement components truly reflect their six dimensions and three democratization-promoting mechanisms of linkage.

3 Conclusion

The study contributes to our understanding of linkage to a *democratic*, non-Western regional power and its chance of influencing the regime type of connected countries in its region. The analysis of the democratizing impact of South African linkage and leverage in the southern African region attenuates optimism about the strength of such regional influences to replace missing Western linkage and induce full democratization in neighboring countries. Chances for democratization in Swaziland and Zimbabwe actually decreased since the 1990s. And the playing field in party competition remained skewed even in Lesotho, where conditions for full democratization through South African linkage were most formidable during the window of opportunity between 1993 and 2002 and beyond.

A first explanation for the relative unsuccessfulness of South African democracy promotion in the region can be found in South Africa's foreign policy priority of "African solidarity" that attempted to secure the fragile acceptance of its regional hegemony and took precedence over its initially sincere policy of democracy promotion. This finding suggests that rising regional hegemons might be particularly bad at democracy promotion in their sphere of influence – such as South Africa in Africa, Brazil in Latin America, and India on the Indian subcontinent – because their regional hegemony is relatively more fragile and dependent on the regional acceptance of

[11] Information in this section is based on personal observation during field research and interviews with political experts in Maseru, Lesotho, in July 2010.

their hegemony in opposition to global hegemons, such as the U.S, that can base their hegemony on the mere fact of their overwhelming military and economic dominance. Future research should look into similar cases of non-Western regional hegemony and their chances of influencing the regime type of connected countries in their region, i.e., Brazil and India, to further substantiate the findings of this article.

A second explanation for the relative unsuccessfulness of regional democracy promotion can be found in the fact that high linkage between South Africa and Lesotho according to Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) measurement components of linkage turns out to be not as dense as suggested in a more qualitative assessment of linkage between the two countries. This begs the question of whether Levitsky and Way's (2010, pp. 43–50, 374–375) measurement components of linkage truly reflect their six dimensions and three democratization-promoting mechanisms of linkage.

In the case of Lesotho and its recent 2012 elections, the study also shows that incumbency change through elections does not necessarily lead to full democratization. Instead, Lesotho's competitive and moderately authoritarian regime followed the path of unstable competitive authoritarianism after 1993 until incumbency change in 2012. Accordingly, the improved *Political Rights'* rating due to incumbency change in the Lesotho 2012 elections demonstrates a general turnover bias in Freedom House ratings. Incumbency change through the ballot box is automatically rewarded without sufficient attention to the playing field conditions that were present in advance of such elections. This finding contributes to recent research on the mixed effects of electoral turnover on democratization of competitive authoritarian regimes in Africa (Wahman 2014).

References

afrol News. 2013. *Lesotho will be hard-hit by declining SACU nues*. http://www.afrol.com/articles/34242. Accessed 15.10.13.

Alden, Chris and Garth lePere. 2004. *South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy: From Reconciliation to Revival? Adelphi paper 362*. Oxford: Oxford University Press and International Institute for Strategic Studies.

allAfrica. 2012a. *Southern Africa Report. Lesotho: Opposition Trounces sisili*. http://allafrica.com/stories/201206010950.html. Accessed 30.09.13.

allAfrica. 2012b. *Southern Africa Report. Lesotho: Jumping Before He's Pushed*. http://allafrica.com/stories/201202101099.html. Accessed 30.09.13.

Bardill, John E. and James H. Cobbe. 1985. *Lesotho. Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*. Boulder: Westview.

Boix, Charles. 2011. Democracy, Development, and the International System. *American Political Science Review* 105(4): 809–828.

Booth, Alan R. 2000. *Historical Dictionary of Swaziland*. 2nd ed. Lanham: Scarecrow.

Brownlee, Jason. 2012. *Democracy Prevention. The Politics of the U.S.-Egyptian Alliance*. New York:

Cambridge University Press.
Cobbe, Jim. 2012. Country Profiles. Lesotho: From Labor Reserve to Depopulating Periphery? *Migration Information Source*. http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm? ID=891. Accessed 30.09.13.
Coplan, David B. and Tim Quinlan. 1997. A Chief by the People: Nation versus State in Lesotho. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute* 67(1): 27–60.
EISA. 2013. *EISA Election Observer Mission Report. Lesotho. Parliamentary Elections 26 May 2012*. Johannesburg: EISA.
Elklit, Jorgen. 2002. Lesotho 2002: Africa's first MMP elections. *Journal of African Elections* 1(2): 1–9.
Elklit, Jorgen. 2008. The 2007 General Election in Lesotho: Abuse of the MMP System? *Journal of African Elections* 7(1): 10–19.
Fischer Weltalmanach. 2003. *Der Fischer Weltalmanach 2003*. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.
Freedom House. 1993–2000. *Freedom House. Freedom In The World*. New York: Freedom House.
Freedom House. 1999-2013. *Freedom House. Freedom In The World. ports*. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world. Accessed 31.01.14.
Freedom House. 2013b. *Freedom House. Freedom of the Press. South ca*. http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/south-africa. Accessed 30.09.13.
Freedom House. 2013c. *Freedom House. Data*. http://www.freedomhouse.org/ Accessed 30.09.13.
Freeman, Linda. 2005. South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy: Unravelling the contradictions. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 23(2): 147–172.
Go Lesotho. 2014. *Consulates and Embassies in Lesotho. Embassies / High Commissions. Go Lesotho*. http://www.golesotho.co.za/Embassies.html. Accessed 10.07.14.
Graham, Matthew. 2012. Foreign Policy in Transition: The ANC's Search for a Foreign Policy Direction during South Africa's Transition, 1990–1994. *The Round Table* 101(5): 405–423.
Graham, Victoria. 2006. How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006. *African Security Review* 15(4): 114–127.
Kabemba, Claude. 2004. From Military Rule to Multiparty Democracy: Political Reforms and Challenges in Lesotho. *EISA Research Report* (2).
Langa, P. 1998. *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Conduct and Results of the Lesotho General Elections Held in May 1998*. Mimeo.
Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Likoti, Fako. 2008. The Electoral Process and the 2007 Snap Elections in Lesotho. *Review of Southern African Studies* 12(1-2): 150–183.
Likoti, Fako. 2009. The 2007 General Election in Lesotho: The Application and the Challenges of the Electoral System. *African Studies Quarterly* 10(4): 57–69.
Makthetha, Mookho. 2012. South African Media Coverage of the May 2012 election in Lesotho. *Consultancy Africa Intelligence*. http://www.consultancyafrica.com/. Accessed 30.09.13.
Manoeli, Sebabatso. 2012. Lesotho after AGOA. From textile booms to sustainable development. *The Brenthurst Foundation. Discussion Paper 6/2012* .
Matlosa, Khabele. 1997. Vulnerability and Viability of Small States in Southern Africa in a Post-Apartheid Era: Is South Africa still "Big Brother? *Journal of African Studies* 11(2): 117–131.
Matlosa, Khabele. 1998. Democracy and Conflict in Post-Apartheid Southern Africa: Dilemmas of Social Change in Small States. *International Affairs* 74(2): 319–337.
Namibweb. 2014. *Diplomatic missions in Windhoek*. http://www.namibweb.com/embassies.html. Accessed 10.07.14.
Ntaote, Billy. 2013. Thabane orders Moleleki's arrest. *Public Eye*. http://publiceye.co.ls/? p=1691. Accessed 31.01.14.
Nunley, Albert C. 2013. *African Elections Database*. http://africanelections.tripod.com/ Accessed 30.09.13.
OECD. 2011. *Aid Effectiveness 2011: Progress in Implementing the Paris Declaration — Volume II Country Chapters. Lesotho*. http://www.oecd.org/development/effectiveness/Lesothopdf. Accessed 30.06.14.
Prys, Miriam. 2009. Regional Hegemon or Regional Bystander: South Africa's Zimbabwe Policy

2000–2005. *Politikon: South African Journal of Political Studies* 36(2): 193–218.
Public Eye. 2013. *Some don't even know why they were made Ministers: Tšehlana*. 18.01.13. http://publiceye.co.ls/? p=1063. Accessed 30.09.13.
QoG. 2013. *The Quality of Government Dataset*. University of Gothenburg: The QOG Institute.
Republic of Botswana. 2014. *Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. Diplomatic Missions*. http://www.mofaic.gov.bw/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=74&Itemid=74. Accessed 10.07.14.
Rosenberg, Scott, Richard F. Weisfelder and Michelle Frisbie-Fulton. 2004. *Historical dictionary of Lesotho*. Lanham: Scarecrow.
Southall, Roger. 1994. The 1993 Lesotho Election. *Review of African Political Economy* 21(59): 110–118.
Southall, Roger. 2003. An unlikely success: South Africa and Lesotho's election of 2002. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 41(2): 269–296.
Southall, Roger. 2013. *Liberation Movements in Power. Party and State in Southern Africa*. Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal.
Southall, Roger and Roddy Fox. 1999. Lesotho's general election of 1998: rigged or de riguer? *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(4): 669–696.
Sunday Express. 2012. *Thabane pledges to fight corruption*. 09.06.12. http://sundayexpress.co.ls/? p=6815. Accessed 30.09.13.
Tefo, Tefo. 2013. MPs Accused of Fraud. *Public Eye*. http://publiceye.co.ls/? p=2536. Accessed 30.09.13.
U.S. Department of State. 2000. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Lesotho. 1999*. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/1999/253.htm. Accessed 30.09.13.
U.S. Department of State. 2008. *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Lesotho. 2007*. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100488.htm. Accessed 30.09.13.
van Aardt, M. 1996. A Foreign Policy to Die For: South Africa's Response to the Nigerian Crisis. *Africa Insight* 26(2): 107–119.
Van der Vleuten, Anna Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann. 2010. Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations: Comparing EU, Mercosur and SADC. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 48(3): 737–758.
Wahman, Michael. 2014. Democratization and Electoral Turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa and Beyond. *Democratization* 21(2): 220–243.
Wood, Geoffrey, Pauline Dibben and Klerck Gilton. 2013. The Limits of Transnational Solidarity: The Congress of South African Trade Unions and the Swaziland and Zimbabwean Crises. *Labor History* 54(5): 527–539.
World Bank. 2009. *Africa development indicators: from World Bank Africa Database*. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Youngs, Richard. 2010. Introduction: Idealism at Bay. In *The European Union and Democracy Promotion*, ed. Richard Youngs, 1–15. Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press.